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Law is heavily dependent on other disciplines when it is called upon to 
exercise one of its main functions, namely, resolving disputes. Through the use 
of experts, legal decisionmakers consider evidence bearing on the contested 
facts at issue in the litigation. But problems frequently arise over the differences 
in legal assumptions about evidence and how it is to be used and assumptions 
brought by other disciplines—science among them—about the use of evidence. 
The disjuncture occurs because the conventions used in the law and in other 
disciplines differ. 
This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems is devoted to exploring the 
conflict between the conventions used in law and the conventions used in these 
other disciplines. A “convention” is a generally agreed-upon practice within a 
group or a discipline that facilitates communication and social interaction. It is a 
rule of discourse or behavior that is generally understood without further 
explanation or justification, making it efficient but also a source of confusion 
when the conventions of one group are used in another group’s venue. Even 
closely related disciplines may have conventions different enough to cause 
confusion. Law has many conventions involving both substantive and 
procedural matters. Yet legal decisionmakers are highly dependent on experts 
from other disciplines to provide evidence upon which their decisions will be 
grounded. The appearance of the expert—whether a scientist or an expert from 
the field of history, economics, political science, or art—sets the scene for a 
classic example of clashing conventions. The styles of discourse, warrants for 
belief, standards of evidence, and other conventions are often so vastly different 
between law and other disciplines that they are sources of mischief and 
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confusion for legal decisionmakers as well as for the experts from these 
“outside” disciplines who enter into the legal arena. 
For example, the conventions of scientific discourse in the scientific setting 
and evidentiary conventions of testifying before a trier of fact in a legal setting 
differ significantly. In the scientific context it is customary (“conventional”) to 
discuss the many sides of an issue, often in a stylized “on the one hand, on the 
other hand” manner. On the witness stand, by contrast, the scientist is 
encouraged to present one side, leaving the experts on the opposing side to 
present “on the other hand.” Indeed, the rules of presentation in a legal forum 
severely constrain a balanced presentation. The legal conventions for 
presenting evidence in common-law, adversarial proceedings are considered a 
necessary part of providing the judge and jury with clean and understandable 
arguments about the two sides of a dispute, but they represent an unnatural 
mode of discourse for scientists and members of other academic disciplines. 
The articles in this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems are the output 
of the Fourth Coronado Conference on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy. 
The conference was convened by the Project on Scientific Knowledge and 
Public Policy (SKAPP), based at the George Washington University School of 
Public Health and Health Services. SKAPP was founded in 2001 by a group of 
scientists who recognized the value of examining how science is used and 
misused in government decisionmaking and in legal proceedings.1 Since then, 
SKAPP has convened four Coronado Conferences. At each one a group of 
distinguished scientists, philosophers of science, judges, and policy experts 
presented papers and discussed issues at the intersection of science, law, and 
public policy. The papers presented at the first Coronado Conference, entitled 
“Scientific Evidence and Public Policy,” were published in the American 
Journal of Public Health;2 the second, “Sequestered Science: the Consequences 
of Undisclosed Knowledge,” in Law and Contemporary Problems;3 and the 
third, “Truth and Advocacy: The Quality and Nature of Litigation and 
Regulatory Science,” in Environmental Health Perspectives.4 
In this issue’s first article, Irreconcilable Differences?, Susan Haack provides 
a brief historical background to the use of scientific experts in law and then 
proceeds to discuss in greater detail the values underlying scientific inquiry, the 
uncertainty in the quest of knowledge and understanding, and the methods by 
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which consensus is reached, even if that consensus is always tentative.5 She then 
contrasts scientific inquiry with the law’s quest for “truth” in the courtroom 
and, particularly, the normative and temporal considerations that drive legal 
decisionmaking. She also emphasizes the selection process by which adversarial 
lawyers selectively choose experts who will offer evidence congruent with their 
clients’ positions, often producing evidence that is “marginal” to mainstream 
scientific thinking. She also discusses the constraints on fully exploring 
disagreements and ambiguity in the current level of knowledge within any one 
area of scientific knowledge. 
Jerome Ravetz’s essay both expands on and disagrees with parts of Haack’s 
view.6 He argues that the notion of “pure science” that seems to underlie 
Haack’s description may ignore some historical realities. As an example, he 
notes that scientists in late-nineteenth-century Germany collaborated with their 
more practically oriented colleagues to produce knowledge. He then compares 
that collaboration to the present-day use of scientific research in the regulatory 
process, which informs policy even when scientific knowledge is uncertain and 
subject to major revisions, including revisions that contradict earlier knowledge. 
In short, unlike the ideal model of science, the reality of scientific research does 
not follow a single, overarching method of inquiry. Ravetz also makes the 
important point that in legal proceedings the scientific evidence presented by 
experts is often only one part, and sometimes only a small part, of the corpus of 
factual evidence before the court. Ravetz then cautions against outside scholars 
drawing conclusions about the use or misuse of science in legal proceedings 
without considering the total context in which those conclusions are used. 
Herbert Kritzer’s article, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law, 
expands further on Haack’s and Ravetz’s themes by explicitly drawing attention 
to the courtroom as a setting for persuasion rather than for truth.7 He suggests 
four dimensions on which scientific investigations and legal investigations can 
be compared: the choice of “data” or evidence, how the evidence is used, the 
mindset of the inquirer, and the goals of the inquiry. In a common-law 
courtroom, Krtitzer points out, much of the evidence is presented through oral 
testimony and focuses on specific events, whereas science is oriented toward 
conclusions that apply across situations. Partisanship rules in the presentation of 
the evidence, and much of the persuasion process is oriented toward creating 
doubt, as opposed to furthering science’s quest for certainty. An important 
theme running through Kritzer’s article, consistent with Ravetz’s essay, is that 
the courtroom setting creates conditions that are unfavorable to the neutral 
presentation of scientific findings. 
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Joseph Sanders’ article on expert witnesses builds upon the preceding 
articles.8 He further explores the elements of adversarialism in American legal 
proceedings by examining evidence presented in the litigation against Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, whose morning-sickness product Bendectin allegedly 
caused horrific birth defects after women took the drug. Using his background 
in sociology, Sanders explores two themes that emerge from the case study of 
Bendectin. The first theme is “role” pressures: the adversary system replaces 
the expert’s role as an impartial investigator with a partisan role. The second, 
related, theme is the replacement of the standard of scientific rigor with a looser 
standard focused on the specific issues at play in litigation. Sanders concludes 
by pointing out that, despite many differences, law and science share many 
conventions, and each has a preferred goal of reaching a proper outcome. 
Charles Bazerman’s How Does Science Come to Speak in the Courts starts 
with the seemingly very mundane observation that law and science use different 
conventions for the forms in which supporting literature is cited.9 In law the 
purpose is to build decisions on precedents, the memories of and standards on 
which prior cases have been decided. In science, standard citation procedures 
serve a roughly similar purpose, namely, a way of helping to maintain quality. 
Then Bazerman turns to consider how the differing conventions for citation in 
epidemiology played out in litigation over the drug phenylpropanolamine, used 
as an appetite suppressant that allegedly caused hemorrhagic strokes. The 
Daubert hearings in the litigation show a remarkable change in the court’s 
citation of literature and a tilt toward a legal, as opposed to a scientific, 
perspective on the evidence. 
David Kriebel’s How Much Evidence is Enough? shifts our focus to the use 
of evidence in regulatory settings.10 As he asserts in his opening paragraph, a 
“clash of cultures” also occurs around the use of science in the development and 
alteration of regulations. Echoing points made in the preceding articles, Kriebel 
draws attention to the fact that not all scientific research that is undertaken can 
be considered to have the goal of “pure” science. Environmental-health science 
is a prime example. Research on environmental hazards is directed toward 
informing policymakers, but there are often major degrees of uncertainty about 
causal relationships. Disruptions in natural systems or cycles and their effects 
on living things have major effects on humans and other organisms, but 
inferences about the causes of the disruptions and their effects involve a great 
deal of uncertainty. Yet, for the environmental scientist, there is often an 
urgency in offering advice to prevent further harm. Kriebel illustrates the many 
methods used by different researchers, depending on their disciplines and the 
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problems at hand, by considering such disparate fields as anthropology and 
molecular biology. His central theme is that causation is a judgment call made 
by scientists.  
David Rosner’s Trials and Tribulations shifts the focus from science to the 
field of history.11 He traces the use of historians as experts in litigation. 
Historians have played roles in suits on discrimination and voting rights and, 
more recently, in toxic-tort cases involving tobacco, asbestos, lead, and the soft-
drink industry. Rosner draws attention to the controversy and sometimes bitter 
disagreement among scholars, not only about the opinions they have been 
prepared to offer but also about the conditions under which they have been 
recruited and paid. His article documents what he views as corruptions of 
knowledge that are produced by adversarial litigation. 
Gary Edmond’s Merton and the Hot Tub is a very salient closing to this 
symposium issue.12 Edmond describes the attempts in several Australian 
jurisdictions to reduce some of the deleterious effects that the adversarial 
system can have on expert testimony through use of the “concurrent evidence” 
procedure, known colloquially as “hot tubbing.” Following the example of 
England, experts in those courts are now required to explicitly acknowledge 
that their obligation in providing testimony is to the court rather than to the 
party that retained them. Disagreements between opposing experts are subject 
to informal, face-to-face meetings prior to any formal court appearance. In 
these meetings, differences between experts’ opinions are discussed and issues 
narrowed. Edmonds describes his observations of a number of hearings and 
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